Articles Posted in OUI Offenses

What I’m going to write about today will be of interest to not only Massachusetts OUI lawyers such as myself, but to anyone who drives in Massachusetts. Previously, on July 1 of this year, I blogged about a case that was handed down by the United States Supreme Court earlier this year. While I didn’t cite that case by name in that blog, it was Commonwealth v. Melendez-Diaz. In that ruling, the U.S. Supreme Court held that lab reports offered as evidence by prosecutors to prove the chemical composition of substances that it (the prosecution) claimed were illegal drugs, would in the future require the in-person testimony at trial, of the lab technician(s) who actually tested the substance. This ruling was substantial for persons accused of Massachusetts drug crimes, as prior to this ruling, the prosecution needed to introduce only a certificate from the State Police Crime Laboratory, showing that the substance tested was a certain drug.

From that ruling forward, prosecutors would have to bring the specific lab technician who tested the substance into court, to allow the defense to cross-examine him or her as to various aspects of the testing, of their own qualifications and experience, the testing equipment used, etc., etc. The core of the U.S. Supreme Court’s reasoning in this case, was that “Confrontation Clause” of the U.S. Constitution, which requires the appearance of live witnesses who are testifying against a defendant, would be violated without the in-court testimony of the actual lab technician who conducted the drug testing. The decision was widely criticized by prosecutors not only in Massachusetts, but across the nation. (Notably, it was Massachusetts Attorney General Martha Coakley who argued – and lost – the case for the state of Massachusetts.) From the day the decision was handed down, prosecutors have argued that the requirement of personally producing state lab technicians to testify in person about these types of illegal drug possession and drug trafficking cases, would grind prosecutions to a halt: The argument was that District Attorneys’ offices across the state simply prosecute too many of these cases to be saddled with this “burden”.

Recently, things just got a lot more interesting in the Massachusetts criminal court system – and may get even more so in the next few months You see, the ruling on lab technicians in Melendez-Diaz, had been limited to cases where drug samples had been tested by state lab officials, in cases specifically involving Massachusetts illegal drug possession and distribution charges. But last month, in a Marlborough District Court case involving Massachusetts OUI charges, things took an interesting turn. First, some background: The case name is Commonwealth v. Parmenter ,and the defendant, one Brian Parmenter, had been in a motorcycle accident that resulted in severe injuries to him and his passenger. Though Parmenter appeared dead at the scene, a nurse who happened to live near the accident was able to revive him. Parmenter was taken to a hospital, and during his emergency room treatment, blood was drawn by hospital personnel and tested for alcohol for medical reasons.

Importantly, his blood was not tested for alcohol at the request of police or law enforcement authorities. Parmenter was eventually charged with Massachusetts drunk driving/OUI offenses, and prosecutors obtained a warrant for his medical records and test results. Prosecutors obtained these medical records, for the purpose of introducing those records at trial to prove that his blood alcohol level at the time of the accident was .09 or higher (the state limit is .08 – any higher than that, and there is a “per se” presumption in Massachusetts, that an operator was legally impaired.) In what was no surprise to me as a Norfolk County Massachusetts OUI attorney, the prosecution did not intend to call the phlebotomist who conducted the blood test. (No surprise, because prosecutors usually don’t call technicians to the stand in Massachusetts OUI cases. Normally, they just have the arresting police officer testify as to Breathalyzer test results .)

This is where things get interesting: Parmenter’s lawyer filed what is called a “Motion in Limine” (which is a motion made at the start of a trial requesting that the judge rule that certain evidence may not be introduced in trial,) in which he argued that, per the Supreme Court’s ruling in Melendez-Diaz, the hospital blood test could not be admitted without live testimony from the medical technician who either drew the blood or tested it.

In my next post, I’ll explain what happened from there, and what these developments may mean for persons arrested for Massachusetts OUI offenses.
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Drunk driving and other criminal charges have been filed against a 22-year-old Falmouth man who was allegedly operating under the influence of alcohol in last month’s fatal car accident on County Road, in Bourne, Massachusetts, according to police authorities. Jonathan Muir was charged in Barnstable District Court with motor vehicle homicide, motor vehicle homicide while operating under the influence of alcohol, two counts of causing serious bodily injury while operating under the influence of alcohol, operating negligently to endanger, operating under the influence of alcohol, speeding, and a marked lane violation, according to the Bourne Police Department.

Police allege that Muir was driving a 1984 Porsche when it veered off County Road in Bourne and slammed into a tree around 1:30 a.m. on June 29. The car crash killed passenger Cassandra Flynn-Rakos, a 21-year-old Bourne resident and nursing student at Fitchburg State College. Muir and two other passengers, Erica Pouler and Sonya Dangelo, both 21, of Bourne, were seriously injured in the car accident. Muir could face up to 15 years in prison and $5,000 in fines for the motor vehicle homicide charge while under the influence, according to Massachusetts General Laws, or up to 2 1/2 years for motor vehicle homicide. Muir, who moved to Falmouth from Meridian, Connecticut, allegedly has a history of driving infractions in both Massachusetts and in Connecticut, according to registry records from both states. Muir lost his license for almost a year for failing to complete a driver training course in Connecticut within the required time. He was ordered to take the course after being convicted of speeding and driving an unregistered vehicle in April 2007.

He ultimately finished the course, paid the fines and his license was reinstated in July 2008. Following this motor vehicle accident, the Massachusetts Registry of Motor Vehicles immediately and indefinitely revoked Muir’s driver’s license.

Here’s an interesting decision handed down from the Massachusetts Appeals Court recently. Seems a Barnstable District Court judge overstepped his authority in 2007 when he unilaterally upgraded, or beefed up, the charges that the Commonwealth had tried a defendant on involving a 2006 motor vehicle fatality on Cape Cod. The Cape and Island District Attorney’s office had charged the defendant, Gerard Williams, of Cotuit, with vehicular homicide while operating under the influence of alcohol, and also charged him with a separate count of operating a motor vehicle to endanger. After a jury-waived bench trial before Barnstable District Court judge Don Carpenter, the judge found the defendant guilty on the charge of operating a motor vehicle to endanger in the death of William Armstrong, 43, of Hyannis.

Armstrong was killed when his motorcycle collided with Williams’ car on Route 28 in West Yarmouth. On the more serious charge of vehicular homicide while operating under the influence of alcohol, the judge found Williams not guilty. This was chiefly due to the fact that the defendant’s .079 blood alcohol level – a fraction below the .08 legal limit for driving, as well as his four failed field sobriety tests – were ruled not admissible as evidence.

Citing his opinion that the defendant drove negligently in causing the accident, the judge decided to add a new, separate offense of negligent motor vehicle homicide, to the underlying guilty finding of operating to endanger conviction, and sentenced the defendant based on that new charge and finding. One reason that’s so important? On the “operating to endanger conviction,” a drivers’ license is typically suspended 60 days. Upon a conviction of motor vehicle homicide, drivers’ licenses are suspended for 15 years.

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